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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of daily official foreign exchange interventions on the exchange 
rates of two EU candidate countries, namely Croatia and Turkey for the periods from 1996 to 
2004 and from 2001 to 2004, respectively. Using the event study methodology and a variety of 
GARCH models reveals that both the Croatian and the Turkish central banks were in a position 
to influence, to some extent, the level of the exchange rate during the period studied. This lends 
support to the view that foreign exchange intervention may be effective to a limited extent in 
emerging market economies. 
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1. Introduction 
The question of how, if at all, central bank interventions on the foreign exchange markets may 
impact on nominal exchange rates has triggered a large body of literature for the last 20 years or 
so of the post Bretton-Woods period in industrialized OECD economies. Although it is widely 
acknowledged that unsterilised interventions affect the exchange rate by altering relative money 
supplies, the empirical evidence is fairly mixed regarding the effectiveness of sterilized 
interventions, which may work through the portfolio, the signaling and the microstructure (or co-
ordination) channels. In their literature survey, Sarno and Taylor (2001) conclude, however, that 
what emerges from studies focusing on the 1990s is that interventions tend to impact on the 
exchange rates, “especially if the intervention is publicly announced and concerted and provided 
it is consistent with the underlying stance of monetary and fiscal policy”
2. 
It is a well-documented fact that a large number of emerging market economies have moved 
recently from fixed exchange regimes towards more flexible exchange regimes. Nevertheless, 
extensive foreign exchange interventions were undertaken in these countries mainly driven by 
fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhard, 2000) or by a dread of depreciation, as suggested by Dutta 
and Leon (2002). In this context, Canales-Kirjenko (2003) puts forth that foreign exchange 
interventions may be more effective in emerging market economies as compared to well-
established industrialized countries because of the following reasons: (a) central bank 
interventions are not always fully sterilized, (b) the size of interventions is large relative to 
market turnover in narrow forex markets, (c) the market organization and the regulatory 
framework may be more conducive to interventions, (d) moral suasion may play a bigger role, 
and (e) because of the larger informational advantage of the central banks vis-à-vis market 
participants. 
                                                           
2 For limited effectiveness of official interventions, see e.g. Aguilar and Nydahl (2000) for Sweden, Morana and Beltratti (2000) 
for the USD/DEM, Brandner et al. (2001), Brandner and Grech (2002) for the ERM currencies. Brissimis and Chionis (2004) 
suggest that interventions by the ECB were not effective for the yen/euro exchange rate. Fatum (2000) finds evidence for 
effectiveness for the same currency pair. Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000), Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and Brissimis and 
Chionis (2004) show that sterilised interventions were effective for the yen/USD and yen/euro exchange rates. For mixed 
evidence for Australia, see e.g. Kim et al (2000), Kearns and Rigobon (2002), Edison et al. (2003) and Rogers and Siklos (2003).   2
However, there is little empirical research conducted to investigate the effectiveness of central 
bank interventions in emerging and transition economies.
3 In this paper, daily intervention data 
are used to study the extent to which foreign exchange interventions were effective in Croatia 
from 1996 to 2004 and in Turkey from 2001 to 2004.
4 In a first step, we apply the event study 
approach, which is claimed to be superior to econometric analysis if interventions take place 
only sporadically (Fatum, 2000 and Fatum and Hutchison, 2003), and analyze the influence of 
official interventions on the mean and the variance of the exchange rates vis-à-vis the German 
mark prior to 1999 and vis-à-vis the euro after 1999 for Croatia, and vis-à-vis the US dollar for 
Turkey. In a second step, a variety of GARCH models are employed to get an econometric grip 
on the data. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches briefly monetary and 
exchange rate policies and foreign exchange interventions for Croatia and Turkey for the periods 
1996 to 2004 and 2001 to 2004, respectively. Section 3 presents the results of the event study 
approach. Section 4 contains the estimation results of the different GARCH specifications and 
the causality tests. Section 5 finally gives some concluding remarks. 
2. Exchange Rate Regimes and Foreign Exchange 
Interventions 
2.1 Croatia 
Croatia has been having a managed float exchange rate regime since the introduction of the kuna 
in April 1994. Exchange rate policy has been ever since oriented towards the German mark and 
subsequently towards the euro even if there was no official currency basket. During the period 
from January 1996 to November 2004, the exchange rate of the kuna was kept in a fluctuation 
band of –6.7%/+5.2% relative to the period average and the implicit fluctuation band was even 
narrower during some periods of time as can be seen from Figure 1. 
Nominal exchange rate targeting, which is publicly communicated by the Croatian National 
Bank (see e.g. Croatian National Bank, 2001, 2002 and 2003), has its main goal to achieve price 
                                                           
3Canales-Kriljenko (2003), Canales-Kriljenko et al. (2003) and Mihaljek (2005) provides an overview on foreign exchange 
intervention practices in emerging market economies. Domac and Mendoza (2004) and Guiamaraes and Karacadog (2004) study 
daily foreign exchange interventions for the cases of Turkey and Mexico.   3
stability. Back in 1994, the managed floating regime and the new kuna were introduced to stem 
hyperinflation as high as 1518% on average in 1993. Yearly average inflation rapidly went down 
to 2.0% in 1995 and has been ever since in low single-digit territories (1.8% in 2003). The 
nominal exchange rate target secures price stability through stable imported inflation (and via its 
second round effects), an important factor in a highly euroised country such as Croatia, and, 
perhaps more importantly, it acts as an anchor for inflation expectations. 
The Croatian National Bank (CNB) regularly intervenes on the foreign exchange market to 
stabilise the kuna against the euro (German mark) in both directions. Excessive exchange rate 
movements are actually interpreted by the CNB as an appreciation or a depreciation of the kuna 
vis-à-vis the euro of about 2% and higher than 2%
5. It should be noted that part of the exchange 
rate movements is due to seasonal factors. The kuna tends to depreciate at the beginning and at 
the end of the year because of a seasonal worsening of the current account, and it appreciates 
during the summer period because of an increased demand for kunas in the tourist season. If 
judged excessive, the central bank also acts to counteract seasonal movements in the exchange 
rate. 
Foreign exchange interventions are achieved through foreign exchange auctions, where the 
central bank sells or buys domestic currency to and from domestic commercial banks. From 
2001 onwards, off-market interventions also took place to prevent appreciation pressures coming 
from the conversion of privatization revenues (Croatian Telecom, 2001; INA (Croatian oil 
company), 2003). The central bank bought or sold foreign currency to and from the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Finance held the foreign exchange obtained from issuing eurobonds 
on its account at the CNB. 
Foreign exchange interventions are sterilized by the central bank mainly (a) via reserve 
requirements for the banks and (b) by issuing foreign currency and kuna central bank bills. The 
CNB has recently made efforts to move towards more market-based instruments. In this attempt, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Other CEECs are not included because of the lack of daily intervention data. 
5 CNB (2001,p. 33): «The kuna/euro value grew by 1.8% in nominal terms in July in comparison with end-June, while it had 
strengthened by 0.5% in July 2000. In an effort to eases the intense appreciation of the exchange rate of the kuna against the euro, 
the central bank purchases from banks a total of USD 122.9m ». 
CNB (2001,p. 34) : «The last quarter of 2001 was marked by a nominal appreciation of the kuna against the euro of 2.3% (…). In 
an effort to keep exchange rate movements within satisfactory stability boundaries, the central bank purchased from banks a total 
of USD 338.5m» 
CNB (2003,p 40) : «In this period, the kuna weakened against the euro by a total of 3.4% (…). The kuna depreciation stimulated 
the sale of foreign exchange at the central bank’s auctions in the first quarter of 2003. »   4
it unified the kuna and foreign currency requirements in 2000 (e.g. regarding the calculation 
period and the maintenance period). Since 2001, the reserve requirement rate was decreased 
several times, and this was compensated by a widening of the calculation base (CNB, 2001, 
2002, and 2003). 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show foreign exchange interventions via auction in the interbank foreign 
exchange market. The Croatian National Bank intervened on 187 occasions from 1996 to 2004: 
It purchased the domestic currency on 88 occasions and sold it 99 times. The CNB’s intervention 
activity was intensive in 1996, 1998 and 1999 with over 30 yearly interventions. 2001 and 2002 
are characterized by roughly 20 interventions a year, while 1997 and more recently 2003 and 
2004 can be viewed as periods of calm with about 10 interventions a year. Although the number 
of sales and purchases is fairly balanced for the period as a whole, sales outweighed purchases in 
1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004, whilst purchases occurred more frequently in 1998, 
1999 and 2003. 
Figure 1. Interventions and the kuna/euro (German mark) exchange rate, Croatia, 1996-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Croatian National Bank 
Notes: Interventions are in billions of Croatian kuna. Negative (positive) values show kuna purchases (sales). The exchange rate is 
shown as the deviation from the period average kuna/euro (German mark) exchange rate 
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Table 1. Summary of interventions activities by the Croatian National Bank, 1996-2004 
(HRK millions) 
Summary Mean  Median  Min  Max  SD  Days of intervention 
1996 Total  73  23  1  369  96  39 
 Sales  124  98  4  369  100 22 
 Purchases  7  2  1  76  18  17 
1997 Total  160  105  18  454  155 12 
 Sales  195  194  30  454  163 9 
 Purchases  57  32  18  120  56  3 
1998 Total  109  85  1  475  96  43 
 Sales  67  58  1  219  59  19 
 Purchases  142  105  31  475  108 24 
1999 Total  229  168  4  716  200 30 
 Sales  23  22  4  48  16  8 
 Purchases  304  299  59  716  182 22 
2000 Total  467  533  112 702  225 8 
 Sales  490  593  180 684  206 5 
 Purchases  429  472  112 702  298 3 
2001 Total  500  396  14  1488 378 20 
 Sales  455  396  14  1029 268 14 
 Purchases  606  397  54  1488 580 6 
2002 Total  421  374  137 904  245 17 
 Sales  458  386  152 904  265 12 
 Purchases  332  326  137 564  183 5 
2003 Total  444  458  99  646  171 9 
 Sales  646  646  646 646  0  1 
 Purchases  418  439  99  635  164 8 
2004 Total  250  199  129 440  126 9 
 Sales  250  199  129 440  126 9 
  Purchases --  --  -- -- --  0 
1996-2004 Total  232  152  1  1488 245 187 
 Sales  234  163  1  1029 236 99 
 Purchases  231  138  1  1488 256 88 
   Source:  Author’s  calculations 
2.2 Turkey 
Although Turkey’s exchange rate stabilization program, which rested on a pre-announced 
crawling peg exchange rate regime, had the merit to having brought down year-on-year inflation 
from 68.8% in December 1999 to 39% in December 2000, it culminated in a currency crisis in 
early 2001. As a result, a floating exchange rate regime was introduced on February 22, 2001. 
This was part of a new monetary policy, which can be best described as an implicit inflation 
targeting. Under this regime, the central bank pursues an inflation target at a given horizon in the 
future. The central bank’s main instruments are short-term interest rates. The base money and net 
international reserves are used as “indicative criteria”, which can be perhaps deemed as 
intermediate targets. Net domestic assets, measuring domestic credit expansion, are considered 
as an indicator for monetary policy. This monetary policy framework was underpinned with the 
amendment of the Central Bank Act on May 5, 2001, aimed at securing the operational 
independence of the central bank.   6
The role of foreign exchange interventions is understood to be limited in such a framework. The 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) has been stressing in its official publications 
that foreign exchange interventions should take place as rarely as possible and in a transparent 
manner (CBRT, 2001, p. 109 and CBRT, 2004, paragraph 34). In addition to this, it is also 
emphasized that foreign exchange interventions do not intend to target any precise level of the 
exchange rate but aims to dampen excessive volatility instead and is used for building 
international reserves.
6 When considering exchange rate volatility, the central bank not only 
looks at past and present volatilities but also considers expected changes in volatility occurring in 
the future (CBRT, 2004, paragraph 26). 
However, reading between the lines may reveal that the central bank may give a lower weight to 
decreasing excessive exchange rate volatility and it may ponder to alter the trend of the exchange 
rate. According to CBRT (2002, p. 74), “foreign exchange auctions were temporarily suspended 
as of July due to the volatilities of exchange rates”, which is in contradiction with the declared 
intention to counteract excessive volatility. It is also mentioned several times that the central 
bank considers excessive volatility in both directions. Given that volatility is an absolute 
measure, this may indicate that the CBRT also looks at changes in the exchange rate.
7 
The central bank carries out several operations to sterilize foreign exchange interventions by 
means of (1) Turkish lira deposit operations in the interbank money market and (2) reverse repo 
transactions at the Istanbul Stock Exchange. It also ensures that short-term money market interest 
rates remain in line with the inflation target. 
The interventions of the central bank were mostly carried out based on either discretionary or 
pre-announced auctions. However, the central bank also did some direct discretionary 
interventions on the forex markets. The amount of these discretionary interventions is not 
                                                           
6 CTB (2001, p. 109) : «  The Central Bank conducted regular FX sales auctions after March 29 in order to smooth excessive 
short-run exchange rate fluctuations without affecting the long-run equilibrium level of exchange rates… » 
CTB (2002, p. 71) : « …the Central Bank announced that it would intervene in the foreign exchange rate market in a strictly 
limited fashion to prevent excessive volatility without targeting a certain trend level. » 
CTB (2004, paragraph 34)  : «  The Bank has not performed any foreign exchange buying or selling operations intended at 
determining the level or direction of the exchange rates. The Bank’s foreign exchange buying or selling operations aimed at 
controlling excessive volatilities. » 
7 CTB(2003, p.97) : « (…) it would directly intervene in the event of excessive volatility that might occur in both directions ». 
CTB (2002, p. 96) : «  (…) the Central Bank did not target any exchange rate level and that it would respond symmetrically to 
both upward and downward volatility. »   7
reported by the central bank.
8 Table 3 and Figure 2 provide an overview of the interventions via 
discretionary and pre-announced auctions, from which it can be seen that the central bank 
intervened massively on four occasions. First, it purchased Turkish lira 124 times in 2001 in the 
aftermath of the crisis. The remaining three intervention episodes are all lira selling operations, 
which contain 33 (2002), 117 (2003) and 62 (2004) separate intervention acts. As reported in 
diverse central bank publications, these operations resulted in a substantial increase in 
international reserves, which is consistent with the monetary policy framework (international 
reserves are an intermediate target). 
Figure 2. Interventions and the Turkish lira/dollar exchange rate, Turkey, 2001-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Note: Interventions are in billions of USD. Negative (positive) values show lira purchases (sales).The exchange rate is 
shown as the deviation from the period average lira/dollar  exchange rate 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of interventions activities by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
2001-2004 (USD millions) 
Summary  Mean Median Min Max SD Days of intervention 
2001 Total  53  50  20  274 51 124 
 Sales  --  --  --  --  --  0 
 Purchases  53  50  20  274 51 124 
2002 Total  24  20  4  40  10 33 
 Sales  24  20  4  40  10 33 
 Purchases  --  --  --  --  --  0 
2003 Total  43  50  2  80  18 117 
 Sales  43  50  2  80  18 117 
 Purchases  --  --  --  --  --  0 
2004 Total  40  40  30  70  11 62 
 Sales  40  40  30  70  11 62 
 Purchases  --  --  --  --  --  0 
2001-2004 Total  44  40  2  274 34 336 
 Sales  39  40  2  80  16 212 
 Purchases  53  50  20  274 51 124 
   Source:  Author’s  calculations 
                                                           
8 Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) provide a useful overview regarding the types of central bank interventions from February 
2002 to November 2003. 
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3. The Effectiveness of Interventions: An Event Study 
Approach 
3.1 Methodological Issues 
If foreign exchange interventions occur rarely or only after a large number of days without 
intervention, standard time series econometric techniques are likely to find that official 
interventions do not have an effect on exchange rates, with the latter being highly volatile in the 
short run (Fatum, 2000; Fatum and Hutchinson,2003). A big advantage of the event study 
approach over time series techniques is that it only looks at periods when interventions take 
place, and is thus able to filter out longer periods during which no interventions happen and 
which might cause econometric studies to find no relation between foreign exchange 
interventions and exchange rate behavior. 
When applying the event study approach, three issues have to be tackled:  
(a) how single interventions in one direction can form a single intervention episode or event,  
(b) under what circumstances an intervention episode can be viewed as effective/successful. 
(c) how long a time horizon should be analyzed before and after the intervention event 
(definition of pre- and post-event windows) 
Regarding the definition of an intervention event, the question is of how many days may separate 
two single intervention acts going in the same direction (both purchases or both sales) can be 
considered as two distinct intervention events. If too few, say one or two, days, are taken as the 
boundary between two intervention events, overlaps between the pre- and post-event may occur, 
which makes it difficult to interpret the effect of a given intervention event on the exchange rate 
in the pre- and post event windows because of the simultaneous impact of the overlapping 
intervention events. Furthermore, setting the distance too short may lead to the overestimation of 
the intervention episodes. By contrast, if too large a distance is set between single interventions 
to form a common intervention episode, the risk then is to underestimate the number of true 
intervention episodes (Fatum, 2000). 
Five alternative definitions of the intervention event are considered in this study. We consider 
intervention events, which comprise single interventions in one direction between which up to 2,   9
5, 10, 20 and 30 consecutive days can pass without intervention activity. The intervention event 
ends if more than 2, 5, 10, 20 or 30 days go by without intervention or if an intervention in the 
other direction takes place.
9  
Turning now to measuring the effectiveness of an intervention event, a central bank intervention 
can be thought of as being effective, if purchases (sales) of the domestic currency result in an 
appreciation (deprecation). Nevertheless, the definition of success crucially hinges on the 
direction of the exchange rate prior to the intervention event. In this sense, the following three 
classes of effective interventions can be distinguished. 
Leaning against the wind: the central bank intervention may intend to reverse the trend of the 
exchange rate. Such an intervention is deemed a success if the exchange rate depreciate 
(appreciate) in the pre-event window, and following the purchases (sales) of domestic currency, 
it appreciates (depreciates) in the post-event window: 
Buying the domestic currency:   ( 0 < t I , 0 > ∆ − t e and 0 < ∆ + t e ) 
Selling the domestic currency:   ( 0 > t I , 0 < ∆ − t e and 0 > ∆ + t e ) 
Where 0 < t I  (0 > t I ) stands for purchases (sales) of the domestic currency,  − ∆ t e is the change 
in the exchange rate in the pre-event window, and  + ∆ t e is the change in the exchange rate in the 
post-event window. 
Smoothing exchange rate movements: the central bank may want to slow down the appreciation 
or the depreciation of the domestic currency. Such an operation is viewed successful in the event 
that buying (selling) the domestic currency causes the exchange rate to depreciate less 
(appreciate more) in the post-event window than in the pre-event window. 
Domestic currency purchases:  ( 0 < t I , 0 > ∆ − t e , 0 > ∆ + t e  and  − + ∆ < ∆ t t e e ) 
Domestic currency sales:    ( 0 < t I , 0 < ∆ − t e , 0 < ∆ + t e  and  − + ∆ > ∆ t t e e ) 
Leaning with the wind: Such a strategy involves an amplification of an ongoing trend in the 
exchange rate market. In such a case, purchases (sales) of the domestic currency should cause the 
exchange rate to appreciate more (depreciate more) after the intervention episode than before the 
intervention episode.  
                                                           
9 Fatum (2000) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003) use up to 15 days and Edison et al. (2003) use up to 10 days with no 
intervention between two neighbouring interventions within an event.   10
Buying the domestic currency:   ( 0 < t I , 0 < ∆ − t e , 0 < ∆ + t e  and  − + ∆ < ∆ t t e e ) 
Selling the domestic currency:  ( 0 > t I , 0 > ∆ − t e , 0 > ∆ + t e  and  − + ∆ > ∆ t t e e ) 
As to the size of the pre- and post-event windows, we look at six different lengths: 2, 5, 10, 20, 
30, 40 and 60. The pre- and post-event windows are constructed in a symmetric way implying 
that a 2-day (5-day etc.) pre-event window is compared to a 2-day (5-day etc.) post-event 
window.
10 In addition, effectiveness is also analyzed for the event window itself. The pre-event 
window is set to 2, 5, 10, 20 and 30 days if the event window size is equal or lower than 2 days 
(higher than 2 (5, 10, 20 and 30) but equal or lower than 5 (10, 20 and 30)).  
Finally, not only changes in the exchange rate but also changes in the volatility of the exchange 
rate can be analyzed. For this purpose, volatility measured as standard deviation over the 
(symmetric) pre- and post-event windows are compared. 
3.2. Results 
Croatia 
Table 3 below documents that in Croatia, the identification of intervention episodes is fairly 
sensitive to the maximum days of no intervention elapsed between two single intervention acts. 
Using maximum two days yields a total of 148 intervention episodes, and this number drops to 
71 when 10 days are employed. When the criterion is set at 20 or 30 days, the number of 
identified episodes drops further to 49 and 46, respectively.  
Table 3. The number of the identified intervention episodes 
    Maximum days of intervention inactivity between two 
consecutive interventions 
    2 days  5 days  10 days   20 days   30 days 
Croatia  1996:01 to 2004:10  148  95  71  49  46 
Turkey  2001:01 to 2004:06  10  5  4  4  4 
 
Summary statistics are provided for each filter in Tables 4 and 5. Despite the difference 
regarding the number of identified intervention episodes, a number of common features can be 
observed for the intervention episodes based on different filters. First, Table 4 documents the 
high number of episodes, for which the effectiveness of interventions can be addressed only for 
                                                           
10 Fatum (2000) employs 2, 5, 10, and 15-day window sizes, whilst Edison et al. (2003) looks at 2-day and 21-day windows. 
Edison and others term the 2-day window the short-term and the 21-day window the long-term.   11
the pre-event window and the event window itself, but not for the post-event window because the 
next intervention episode starts the next day or one day later after the episodes considered. This 
is because the central bank changed the direction of the intervention, and after buying (selling) 
the domestic currency against the euro (German mark) on one day, it started selling (buying) the 
kuna the next day or so. In addition to this, for another bunch of episodes, the impact of the 
episode on changes in the exchange rate can be assessed only at the shorter horizons because of 
the short distance separating the episodes. The shorter the maximum days of no interventions 
used for the episode selection, the lower the number of non-overlapping longer pre- and post-
event windows. Using maximum 2 days, 46% of the episodes can be assessed for the pre- and 
post-event window size of 5 days, and the share of assessable episodes for 10, 20 and 30-day 
post-event windows drops to 20%, 7% and 3%, respectively. For the post-event window of 60 
days, all the episodes overlap with other episodes. Although the share of episodes with no 
overlap increases with the rise in the maximum days of no intervention, it is still fairly low. For 
maximum 30 days, for the 10-day post-event window, 35% of the episodes can be analyzed 
without overlaps occurring, and the share goes down to 11% for the 60-day post-event window. 
Hence, the effectiveness of central bank interventions can be studied only partially for Croatia 
using the study event approach. 
An episode is qualified as a success if the episode can be viewed as leaning against the wind 
(WIND), smoothing exchange rate movements (SMOOTH), or leaning with the wind (WITH) in 
accordance with the criteria explained in the previous section. Table 4 also reports successful and 
unsuccessful episodes as a share of non-overlapping episodes. The share of successful episodes 
is fairly high and stable for different post-window sizes and event sizes. It ranges from about 
60% to 80%. 
As far a the relative share of the three types of successful intervention (leaning with and against 
the wind and smoothing) is concerned, Table 4 reveals that the successful intervention the 
overwhelming majority of episodes classifies as either a leaning against the wind or exchange 
rate smoothing both within the event window or when comparing the pre- and post-event 
periods. It appears that exchange rate smoothing is more dominant within the event window, but 
the share of leaning against the wind usually increases for pre- and post-event windows of 20, 30 
and 60 days. This implies that interventions first start to decrease the pace of depreciation or   12
appreciation, and as time passes, they even manage to change the trend on the foreign exchange 
market. 
In Croatia, the decision regarding intervention is taken in the morning, and the auction 
(intervention) is held on the very same day, while the settlement of the intervention occurs two 
days later. This two-day window, which comprises the announcement of the intervention but 
which comprises no actual transaction, enables us to study the signaling effect of interventions. 
In Table 4, under “SIGNAL” are compared changes in the exchange rate prior to a 2-, 5- and 10-
day pre-event window as compared to exchange rate developments in the two-day window. 
Table 4 indicates that there is a signaling effect, which is the most pronounced in the very short 
term (two-day pre-event window). 
Table 4. Non-overlapping episodes, and the share of successful episodes, Croatia 
 SIGNAL  W  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
EVENT SIZE  2 10  20   2  5 10 20 30 40 60 
2 DAYS            
TOTAL EPISODES  148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148  148  148 148
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  97% 36% 16% 100% 92% 46% 20% 7%  3%  2% 1%
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  59% 66% 42% 66% 56% 71% 80% 82%  75%  100% 100%
          WIND (% of assessable)  35% 20% 10% 29% 49% 52% 58% 67%  67%  67% 100%
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  59% 77% 90% 64% 38% 40% 33% 22%  33%  33% 0%
          WITH (% of assessable)  6% 3% 0% 7% 13% 8% 8% 11%  0%  0% 0%
5 DAYS           
TOTAL EPISODES  95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95  95  95 95
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  94% 58% 25% 100% 56% 51% 24% 8%  3%  3% 1%
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  61% 67% 46% 69% 60% 73% 78% 83%  80%  100% 50%
          WIND (% of assessable)  35% 22% 9% 20% 50% 53% 61% 70%  75%  50% 100%
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  56% 76% 91% 77% 36% 40% 32% 20%  25%  50% 0%
          WITH (% of assessable)  9% 3% 0% 3% 14% 7% 7% 10%  0%  0% 0%
10 DAYS           
TOTAL EPISODES  71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71  71  71 71
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  90% 65% 48% 100% 39% 34% 25% 10%  3%  3% 1%
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  66% 70% 32% 65% 69% 80% 76% 87%  100%  100% 100%
          WIND (% of assessable)  36% 25% 9% 24% 50% 68% 68% 62%  75%  50% 100%
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  52% 72% 91% 72% 33% 28% 32% 31%  25%  50% 0%
          WITH (% of assessable)  12% 3% 0% 4% 18% 5% 0% 8%  0%  0% 0%
20 DAYS           
TOTAL EPISODES  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49  49  49 49
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  88% 51% 43% 100% 25% 20% 13% 11%  6%  4% 1%
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  53% 56% 43% 59% 70% 83% 79% 63%  56%  67% 100%
          WIND (% of assessable)  35% 36% 0% 34% 58% 68% 87% 100%  80%  75% 100%
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  57% 64% 100% 62% 23% 20% 20% 20%  40%  50% 0%
          WITH (% of assessable)  9% 0% 0% 3% 19% 12% 0% 0%  0%  0% 0%
30 DAYS           
TOTAL EPISODES  46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46  46  46 46
     ASSESSABLE (% of total)  87% 48% 39% 100% 22% 18% 11% 9%  7%  5% 3%
          SUCCESS (% of assessable)  58% 64% 50% 41% 82% 74% 81% 62%  64%  71% 40%
          WIND (% of assessable)  35% 36% 0% 47% 56% 75% 85% 100%  86%  80% 50%
          SMOOTH (% of assessable)  57% 64% 100% 47% 19% 20% 15% 13%  29%  40% 50%
          WITH (% of assessable)  9% 0 0% 11% 15% 15% 0% 0%  0%  0% 0%
Note: SIGNAL refers to the signaling effect, W in the third column refers to results obtained for the intervention episode itself (how does 
the exchange rate behave during the intervention episode, i.e. within the intervention window.   13
Regarding unconditional exchange rate volatility measured by means of standard deviation, it is 
fair to say according to results reported in Table 5 that interventions are associated with both 
increases and decreases in volatility broadly to the same extent. The share of intervention 
episodes that can be associated with higher exchange rate volatility after the episode than before 
it, is slightly higher, and, on average is close to 60%.
11  
As the overall pattern emerging for episodes using different event window and pre-and post-
event window sizes, is fairly comparable, in-detail results are shown only for episodes obtained 
on the basis of maximum 30 days of no intervention in order to save ink and paper (Tables 6 and 
7).
12 In yellow are marked the pre- and post event windows without any overlap with previous or 
forthcoming intervention episodes. A point to draw attention to is that interventions seem to be 
less successful in the first part of the period under study. For the second part of the period, and 
especially from 2002 to 2004, interventions not only appear to be more effective than previously 
but also the share of leaning against the wind strategy increases dramatically. 
Regarding exchange rate volatility, there are episodes for which whether or not volatility 
increases or decreases hinges largely upon the size of the pre- and post-event window. However, 
in a number of episodes, interventions systematically rise volatility such (episodes No. 1, 18, 27, 
28, 31, 32, 33, 43 and 45) or dampen volatility (episodes No. 2, 8, 17, 26, 29, 37, 40 and 41)
                                                           
11 It should be noted that for single-day episodes, volatility cannot be computed and this implies that exchange rate volatility 
cannot be studied for the episode window. 
12 Results for the episodes determined on the basis of maximum 2, 5, 10 and 20 days of no interventions are available from the 
author upon request. 
Table 5. Intervention episodes and unconditional exchange rate volatility, Croatia 
EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
   WINDOW 2  5  10  20  30  40  60 
2 DAYS    148         
 HIGH  13  (54%)  74  (54%) 41 (60%) 18 (60%) 5 (45%) 1 (25%) 1  (33%) 0
 LOW  11  (46%)  62  (46%) 27 (40%) 12 (40%) 6 (55%) 3 (75%) 2  (67%) 0
5 DAYS    95         
 HIGH  22  (54%)  44  (53%) 42 (56%) 22 (61%) 6 (50%) 2 (40%) 2  (50%) 2 (100%)
 LOW  19  (46%)  39  (47%) 33 (44%) 14 (39%) 6 (50%) 3 (60%)  2 (50%)  0 (0%)
10 DAYS    71         
 HIGH  18  (47%)  32  (55%) 31 (62%) 24 (65%) 8 (53%) 2 (50%) 2  (50%) 1 (100%)
 LOW  20  (53%)  26  (45%) 19 (38%) 13 (35%) 7 (47%) 2 (50%)  2 (50%)  0 (0%)
20 DAYS    49         
  HIGH  23 (68%)  21 (57%) 18 (60%) 14 (74%) 11 (69%) 5 (56%)  4 (67%)  1 (100%)
  LOW  11 (32%)  16 (43%) 12 (40%) 5 (26%) 5 (31%) 4 (44%)  2 (33%)  0 (0%)
30 DAYS    46         
 HIGH  22  (67%)  18  (55%) 15 (56%) 10 (63%) 9 (69%) 7 (64%) 5  (71%) 4 (80%)
  LOW  11 (33%)  15 (45%) 12 (44%) 6 (38%) 4 (31%) 4 (36%)  2 (29%)  1 (20%)
Note: as for Table 4. HIGH (LOW) indicate that exchange rate volatility higher (lower) in the post-event window as compared to the pre-event 
window.   14
Table 6. The effectiveness of intervention episodes based on maximum 30 days of no intervention, Croatia 
No. Start  End  Initial 
intervention 
Total 
intervention
Days of 
Interventions
Total 
days
Next episode
(days away) 
Type of 
intervention 
window 2  5  10 20 30 40 60 
1 10/01/1996 11/01/1996  22.6  30.5 2  2  7  SALE             
2 23/01/1996 01/02/1996  -2.9  -80.9 3  8  10  PURCHASE     WITH WITH         
3 16/02/1996 16/02/1996  60.8  60.9 1  1  7  SALE  WIND  WIND         
4 28/02/1996 06/03/1996  -1.1  -16.0 5  6  1  PURCHASE  WIND  WIND  WITH    WITH  
5 08/03/1996 11/03/1996  46.3  58.5 2  2  2  SALE  W I N D           
6 14/03/1996 14/03/1996  -0.7  -0.7 1  1  1  PURCHASE S M O O T H   W I N D       W I T H   
7 18/03/1996 19/03/1996  3.6  36.5 2  2  2  SALE  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH      
8 22/03/1996 18/04/1996  -4.7  -9.1 4  19  5  PURCHASE WIND  WIND WITH WITH WITH WITH WITH   
9 26/04/1996 05/07/1996  98.5  1058.9 9  49  0  SALE     S M O O T H      S M O O T H  
10 08/07/1996 05/07/1996  -0.7  80.3 2  2  4  PURCHASE         
11 12/07/1996 25/07/1996  234.1  526.0 2  10  0  SALE    SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH WIND  SMOOTH WIND 
12 26/07/1996 30/07/1996  -2.1  -8.8 3  3  2  PURCHASE WITH  WITH   WITH      
13 02/08/1996 21/08/1996  201.5  797.9 3  12  85  SALE  WIND    SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND WIND WIND 
14 20/12/1996 20/12/1996  155.7  155.7 1  1  25  SALE  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND WIND WIND 
15 31/01/1997 28/02/1997  -17.7  -170.1 3  21  18  PURCHASE   WITH    SMOOTH  SMOOTH    WIND 
16 27/03/1997 27/03/1997  30.1  30.1 1  1  32  SALE    WIND  WIND  WIND  WITH     
17 15/05/1997 01/08/1997  70.0  1496.7 7  55  95  SALE               
18 18/12/1997 18/12/1997  223.8  223.8 1  1  94  SALE    SMOOTH          SMOOTH  WIND 
19 08/05/1998 08/07/1998  -38.0  -682.9 8  43  4  PURCHASE SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND WIND WIND WIND SMOOTH 
20 15/07/1998 26/08/1998  48.5  1088.8 15  30  8  SALE    WIND WIND WIND WIND WITH WITH WITH 
21 08/09/1998 18/12/1998  -314.4  -2723.2 16  74  1  PURCHASE   SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH      
22 22/12/1998 31/12/1998  1.5  185.4 4  7  7  SALE    WITH WIND WIND WITH WITH WITH WITH 
23 14/01/1999 31/05/1999  -162.0  -3481.8 12  97  1  PURCHASE   WIND  SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH WIND 
24 02/06/1999 02/06/1999  4.4  4.4 1  1  3  SALE  WIND   WIND WITH WIND WIND SMOOTH  SMOOTH 
25 08/06/1999 08/06/1999  -480.6  -480.7 1  1  21  PURCHASE W I N D   S M O O T H         
26 08/07/1999 02/09/1999  27.4  182.2 7  40  7  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND WIND WITH WIND WIND 
27 14/09/1999 27/01/2000  -390.9  -3541.8 11  93  55  PURCHASE   SMOOTH    SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH 
28 17/04/2000 07/07/2000  180.0  2448.8 5  56  88  SALE    WIND             
29 13/11/2000 13/11/2000  -472.1  -472.1 1  1  51  PURCHASE WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  SMOOTH    SMOOTH     
30 29/01/2001 06/03/2001  -343.2  -490.5 2  27  37  PURCHASE   WIND  SMOOTH  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND WIND 
31 30/04/2001 23/05/2001  383.0  1142.9 3  17  34  SALE      SMOOTH  SMOOTH  WIND  SMOOTH SMOOTH WIND 
32 13/07/2001 13/07/2001  1029.0  1029.0 1  1  20  SALE  SMOOTH    SMOOTH  SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND WIND 
33 13/08/2001 31/08/2001  -451.1  -3091.2 3  14  5  PURCHASE   WIND  WIND WIND WIND WIND WIND WITH 
34 10/09/2001 21/11/2001  970.2  2645.0 7  52  8  SALE    SMOOTH  WIND  WITH      
35 04/12/2001 04/12/2001  -54.4  -54.4 1  1  2  PURCHASE SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND WITH      
36 07/12/2001 19/12/2001  575.7  1556.1 3  9  7  SALE    SMOOTH SMOOTH   WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH 
37 03/01/2002 03/01/2002  373.6  373.6 1  1  9  SALE  WITH  WITH  WITH WIND WIND WIND WIND WIND 
38 17/01/2002 31/01/2002  -325.5  -1060.4 3  11  11  PURCHASE   SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND WIND WIND WIND 
39 18/02/2002 28/06/2002  499.9  4774.6 10  91  32  SALE    WIND  SMOOTH  WIND  WIND     
40 16/08/2002 16/08/2002  347.0  347.0 1  1  47  SALE    SMOOTH  WIND  WIND     WITH  WIND 
41 24/10/2002 29/10/2002  -460.6  -597.7 2  4  46  PURCHASE SMOOTH  SMOOTH  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND SMOOTH 
42 09/01/2003 28/03/2003  -561.0  -2401.4 6  57  163  PURCHASE   WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND 
43 21/11/2003 11/12/2003  -458.4  -944.3 2  15  8  PURCHASE   WIND  WIND WIND SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND 
44 24/12/2003 24/12/2003  646.4  646.4 1  1  51  SALE  SMOOTH  WITH  WIND WIND WIND      
45 11/03/2004 30/03/2004  415.1  1215.1 4  14  64  SALE    WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH 
46 05/07/2004 17/09/2004  199.3  1037.3 5  54  41  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND   
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Table 7. Unconditional exchange rate volatility for intervention episodes based on maximum 30 days of no intervention, Croatia 
No. Start  End  Initial 
intervention
Total 
intervention
Days of 
interventions
Total 
days
Next episode 
(days away) 
Type of 
intervention 
window  2  5  10 20 30 40 60 
1 10/01/1996 11/01/1996  22.6 30.5 2  2  7  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  H I G H        
2 23/01/1996 01/02/1996  -2.9 -80.9 3  8  10  PURCHASE LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW      
3 16/02/1996 16/02/1996  60.8 60.9 1  1  7  SALE    HIGH  LOW LOW LOW HIGH     
4 28/02/1996 06/03/1996  -1.1 -16.0 5  6  1  PURCHASE HIGH  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH   
5 08/03/1996 11/03/1996  46.3 58.5 2  2  2  SALE  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH   
6 14/03/1996 14/03/1996  -0.7 -0.7 1  1  1  PURCHASE    LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH   
7 18/03/1996 19/03/1996  3.6 36.5 2  2  2  SALE  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH   
8 22/03/1996 18/04/1996  -4.7 -9.1 4  19  5  PURCHASE LOW  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW   
9 26/04/1996 05/07/1996  98.5 1058.9 9  49  0  SALE  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW  LOW  LOW 
10 08/07/1996 05/07/1996  -0.7 80.3 2  2  4  PURCHASE HIGH  HIGH LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW 
11  12/07/1996  25/07/1996 234.1 526.0 2 10 0  SALE HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
12 26/07/1996 30/07/1996  -2.1 -8.8 3  3  2  PURCHASE HIGH HIGH  HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
13 02/08/1996 21/08/1996  201.5 797.9 3  12  85  SALE  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW 
14 20/12/1996 20/12/1996  155.7 155.7 1  1  25  SALE    HIGH  LOW  HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW 
15 31/01/1997 28/02/1997  -17.7 -170.1 3  21  18  PURCHASE HIGH  HIGH  LOW  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
16 27/03/1997 27/03/1997  30.1 30.1 1  1  32  SALE    LOW  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
17 15/05/1997 01/08/1997  70.0 1496.7 7  55  95  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  HIGH  LOW HIGH  HIGH 
18 18/12/1997 18/12/1997  223.8 223.8 1  1  94  SALE    LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
19 08/05/1998 08/07/1998  -38.0 -682.9 8  43  4  PURCHASE HIGH  LOW  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
20 15/07/1998 26/08/1998  48.5 1088.8 15  30  8  SALE  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW  LOW  LOW  HIGH 
21 08/09/1998 18/12/1998  -314.4 -2723.2 16  74  1  PURCHASE LOW  HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
22 22/12/1998 31/12/1998  1.5 185.4 4  7  7  SALE  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW 
23 14/01/1999 31/05/1999  -162.0 -3481.8 12  97  1  PURCHASE HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW HIGH  HIGH  LOW 
24 02/06/1999 02/06/1999  4.4 4.4 1  1  3  SALE    LOW LOW LOW HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
25 08/06/1999 08/06/1999  -480.6 -480.7 1  1  21  PURCHASE    LOW  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
26 08/07/1999 02/09/1999  27.4 182.2 7  40  7  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW LOW HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
27 14/09/1999 27/01/2000  -390.9 -3541.8 11  93  55  PURCHASE HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
28 17/04/2000 07/07/2000  180.0 2448.8 5  56  88  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW 
29 13/11/2000 13/11/2000  -472.1 -472.1 1  1  51  PURCHASE    LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  HIGH 
30 29/01/2001 06/03/2001  -343.2 -490.5 2  27  37  PURCHASE LOW  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH 
31 30/04/2001 23/05/2001  383.0 1142.9 3  17  34  SALE  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH 
32 13/07/2001 13/07/2001  1029.0 1029.0 1  1  20  SALE    HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
33 13/08/2001 31/08/2001  -451.1 -3091.2 3  14  5  PURCHASE HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW 
34  10/09/2001  21/11/2001 970.2 2645.0 7 52 8  SALE HIGH  HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
35 04/12/2001 04/12/2001  -54.4 -54.4 1  1  2  PURCHASE    HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
36 07/12/2001 19/12/2001  575.7 1556.1 3  9  7  SALE  LOW  LOW LOW LOW HIGH  LOW HIGH  HIGH 
37 03/01/2002 03/01/2002  373.6 373.6 1  1  9  SALE    LOW  LOW  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
38 17/01/2002 31/01/2002  -325.5 -1060.4 3  11  11  PURCHASE HIGH  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW  HIGH LOW 
39 18/02/2002 28/06/2002  499.9 4774.6 10  91  32  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
40 16/08/2002 16/08/2002  347.0 347.0 1  1  47  SALE    HIGH  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW LOW 
41 24/10/2002 29/10/2002  -460.6 -597.7 2  4  46  PURCHASE HIGH  LOW  HIGH  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW 
42 09/01/2003 28/03/2003  -561.0 -2401.4 6  57  163  PURCHASE HIGH  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
43 21/11/2003 11/12/2003  -458.4 -944.3 2  15  8  PURCHASE HIGH  HIGH  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW 
44 24/12/2003 24/12/2003  646.4 646.4 1  1  51  SALE    LOW  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW HIGH 
45 11/03/2004 30/03/2004  415.1 1215.1 4  14  64  SALE  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
46 05/07/2004 17/09/2004  199.3 1037.3 5  54  41  SALE  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
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Turkey 
As shown in Table 3, the number of intervention episodes in Turkey varies between 10 
(maximum 2 days of no intervention) and 4 (maximum 10, 20 and 30 days of no intervention). 
The number of intervention episodes appears very robust to the use of the 10-day, 20-day and 
30-day filters as four episodes are established in all three cases. The four episodes correspond to 
the four blocks of intervention activities depicted in Figure 2. During the period from 2001 to 
2004, one intervention episode took place each year. In the first intervention episode in 2001, the 
central bank bought the Turkish lira, while in the three remaining intervention events, it sold the 
domestic currency against the dollar. Table 9 hereafter reports the results. In yellow are marked 
the pre- and post event windows without any overlap with previous or forthcoming intervention 
episodes. Given that 59 days elapsed without interventions after the third intervention episode, 
the pre- and post window size of 60 days cannot be assessed for the third and last episodes. 
All four intervention episodes turn out to be very effective, and this for most pre- and post-event 
windows. The intervention episodes can be viewed mainly as leaning against the wind 
operations. Looking at the intervention windows
13 indicates that the first and third intervention 
episodes started as exchange rate smoothing, which subsequently managed to reverse the trend of 
the exchange rate against the US dollar. The third episode did so only at the 2, 5 and 10-day 
horizons beyond which it turned out to be exchange rate smoothing.  
Finally, Table 10 reports the change in the standard deviation-based exchange rate volatility 
between the pre- and post-event window. The first intervention episode is the only episode 
during and after which exchange rate volatility decreased systematically as compared to the 
period preceding it. During the second and last episodes, exchange rate volatility was higher both 
in the event window and after the intervention episode. For the third episode, volatility first 
declined when interventions were taking place, but then increase up to 20 days following it. For 
the post-event windows of 30, 40 and 60 days, it is found to be lower than in the corresponding 
pre-event windows. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
13 This is a worthwhile undertaking because of the large size of the event windows, namely 173, 62, 121 and 63 days, 
respectively.   17
Table 8. Intervention episodes, Turkey 
No. Type  Beginning  End  Initial 
Intervention
Total 
intervention
Days of 
Interventions
Total days of the 
episode 
Next episode 
 (days away) 
1 BUY 29/03/2001  30/11/2001  -200 -6553 124  173  77 
2 SELL 01/04/2002  26/06/2002  20 795 33  62  209 
3 SELL 06/05/2003  22/10/2003  20 4989 117  121  59 
4 SELL 23/01/2004  26/04/2004  30 2480 62  63  143 
 
 
Table 9. The effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions, Turkey 
No. Type  WINDOW  2 5  10  20  30  40  60 
1 PURCHASES  SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND WITH  WIND  WIND   
2 SALES  WIND    WITH WIND WIND  WIND    WIND
3 SALES  SMOOTH  WIND WIND WIND SMOOTH SMOOTH  SMOOTH  
4 SALES  WIND  WIND WIND WIND WIND  WIND  WIND WIND
Note: as for Table 4. 
 
Table 10. Unconditional exchange rate volatility and the intervention episodes, Turkey 
 WINDOW  2  5  10 20 30 40 60 
1 LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW 
2 HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
3 LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW  LOW LOW 
4 HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
Note: as for Table 4. 
 
4. Econometric Investigation 
4.1. Econometric Issues 
4.1.1 Interventions, Exchange Rates and Volatility 
In this section, the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions is analyzed using a GARCH 
framework, which is admittedly well suited for such an investigation because they analyze 
simultaneously the mean and the conditional variance of the exchange rate series. In our 
economic specification, the starting point is the approach proposed by Dominguez (1998) for a 
GARCH(1,1) framework. That is, in the mean equation, the log-difference of the exchange rate 
( t e ∆ , exchange rate returns) are regressed on the intervention series ( t I ), the interest differential 
( t i ∆ ) between overnight money market rates in the home economy and the foreign benchmark 
(Germany and the euro area for Croatia, and the US for Turkey), and dummy variables capturing 
day of the week effects. The conditional variance equation includes the absolute value of 
interventions ( t I ), the interest differential (
*
t t i i − ) and day-of-the-week dummies. 
Given the simultaneity problem arising between interventions and the exchange rate, lagged 
interventions are used instead of contemporaneous intervention. Contrary to Domac and   18
Mendoza (2002) and Giumaraes and Karacadag (2004), a range of lagged interventions are 
employed rather than intervention with a specific lag (e.g. t-2). This does not only allow to 
correct for simultaneity but also helps us to identify the horizon at which interventions have an 
impact on the exchange rate.
14 Finally, lagged values of the exchange rate are also added to the 
mean equation. Our baseline specification is given by equations (1a) to (3a): 
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where  i t I −  takes negative (positive) values for purchases (sales) of the domestic currency. 
3 2 1 D , D , D and  4 D  are dummy variables that take the value of 1 on Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Thursday, respectively. 
2
1 − t ε  and 
2
1 − t σ  are the ARCH and GARCH terms. We 
extend this specification by distinguishing between sales and purchases as they might affect the 
exchange rate asymmetrically
15 and, in a further step, between large and small sales and 
purchases
16. In addition to this, two dummy variables capturing separately the length of sales 
(SL) and purchases (PL) are also added (
PL SL D , D ). The first dummy takes the value of 1 if a 
given intervention act is preceded by intervention activity in (t-1) and (t-2).
17 In addition to this, 
we also use a more loosely defined dummy, which is 1 if any given intervention is preceded by 
intervention during one of the preceding five days, and is 0 otherwise. Equations (1b) to (3b) 
show the extended specification: 
                                                           
14 An alternative approach would be to use instrumental variables for interventions. However, such an approach looks only at the 
contemporaneous effect and not at effects, which manifest at longer horizons. The lag length for interventions and for exchange 
rate returns is determined on the basis of the general-to-specific approach. We first include interventions (exchange rate returns) 
lagged up to ten (five) days, and decrease the maximum lag length until the last lag is found statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
15 Domac and Mendoza (2004) and Giumaraes and Karacadag (2004) show that estimation results for the mean equation are 
sensitive to whether a single intervention variable containing both sales and purchases as in (1) is used or whether sales and 
purchases are considered separately. At the same time, the use of absolute values of interventions in the conditional variance 
equation studies whether higher intervention volumes lead to higher or lower exchange rate volatility. However, it may be also 
legitimate to think that sales and purchases may impact on exchange rate volatility in a different way. 
16 Ísberg and Pétursson (2003) propose to introduce, in addition to aggregate interventions, a dummy, which takes the value of 1 
if aggregate interventions are large and is 0 if they are small. However, using interventions and a closely related dummy may 
vehicle a very similar set of information. This is the reason we break up the intervention series directly in one series containing 
large interventions and another one comprising small interventions. 
17 Ísberg and Pétursson (2003) suggested the use of this dummy variable, which captures long intervention episodes.   19
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where 
SL PS PL I , I , I  and 
SS I  are large purchases (PL), small purchases (PS), large sales (SL) and 
small sales (SS). 
The equations presented thus far rest on a GARCH(1,1) model. In order to check for robustness 
to model specification and to look at possible asymmetries in the conditional variance equation, a 
number of alternative GARCH models are also used for the econometric investigation. These are 
(a) the GARCH in mean (GARCH-M), (b) the exponential GARCH (EGARCH), (c) the 
threshold GARCH (TGARCH) and (d) the component GARCH (CGARCH). 
For the GARCH in Mean, the only difference compared to the standard GARCH model is the 
inclusion of the conditional variance in the mean equation (
2
t ξσ ). The economic interpretation of 
this, shown on the example of equation (1), is that exchange rate returns may depend on 
exchange rate volatility: 
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The TGARCH and EGARCH models modify the conditional variance equation in a way to 
account for asymmetries in the conditional variance. In addition to the standard ARCH and 
GARCH terms, the TGARCH model also includes a dummy term,  1 − t S , that takes the value of 1, 
if 0 1 < − t ε  (negative shock) and is 0 if  0 1 > − t ε  (positive shock).  
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The impact of negative shocks on the conditional variance is higher than that of positive shocks 
if  β λ α > +  and is lower if  β λ α < +  provided  0 ≠ λ . The EGARCH is based on the log-  20
transformed conditional variance, which causes the asymmetric effect to be exponential instead 
of being quadratic as in the TGARCH model: 
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The presence of asymmetry is ensured by  0 ≠ λ . The CGARCH model distinguishes between 
short- and long-term conditional volatility. Contrary to constant conditional volatility in a 
standard GARCH model, long-term volatility ( t q ) is allowed to vary over time, to which the 
short-term volatility or the transitory component of the long-term volatility ( ) qt t −
2 σ ) mean-
reverts. Such a model makes it possible to model separately the effect of interventions on 
exchange rate volatility in the short-run and in the long run. The short-term conditional variance 
model can be written as: 
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The time-varying long-term volatility converges to χ  with ρ  as shown in (8): 
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4.2. Estimation Results 
4.2.1 Croatia 
The estimations are carried out for the whole sample from January 1996 to September 2004 and 
for two subperiods, namely from January 1996 to January 2000 and from April 2000 to 
September 2004.
18 There are a number of reasons for splitting the sample: (1) the event study 
approach showed that interventions were more effective during the 2000s than during the late-
1990; (2) the visual inspection of the exchange rate and intervention series also suggests that the 
series are more volatile in the second half of the sample; and (3)  a new governor was appointed 
in 2000. 
                                                           
18 Alternatively, the subperiods from January 1996 to February 2001 and from March 2001 to February 2004 are also analyzed. 
The results are very similar to those obtained for the subperiods reported in the main text.   21
The summary of the estimation results of the different GARCH models displayed in Tables 11a 
to 11c show that the simple GARCH model appears to be sufficient to describe the data as the 
garch-in-mean terms (ξ ) - with one exception - , the asymmetric terms (λ ) of the exponential 
and threshold GARCH models and all structural parameters of the component GARCH model 
are found to be statistically insignificant. The ARCH and GARCH terms (α  and β ) are strongly 
significant and they sum up to considerably less than one for the subperiods, indicating that the 
data are not fractionally integrated. Therefore, we focus on the results obtained for the simple 
GARCH model
19. 
As far as results for aggregate interventions reported in Table 11a are concerned, interventions 
appear to have a negative effect on exchange rate returns for the first subsample (and for the 
entire sample). Recalling that kuna purchases (sales) are denoted by negative (positive) values 
and that the exchange rate is defined as domestic currency units in terms of one unit of foreign 
currency, these results imply that kuna purchases (sales) associated with a depreciation 
(appreciation) and that interventions are either ineffective or smoothing the exchange rate. At the 
same time, results for the conditional variance equation show that interventions dampen 
exchange rate volatility. Looking at more disaggregated intervention data largely confirm these 
findings: interventions have mostly a negative relationship to the exchange rate. However, some 
qualification is needed. Large kuna purchases
20 are negatively correlated with exchange rate 
returns, while small kuna purchases are found usually to be insignificant. Both large and small 
kuna sales tend to be negatively related to the exchange rate with a lag length of up to four days. 
However, large kuna sales with a lag of six days and small kuna sales lagged with seven days are 
positively associated with the exchange rate. Concerning exchange rate volatility, both large 
kuna purchases and large kuna sales tend to increase exchange rate volatility
21. Small domestic 
currency sales and purchases do not have any effect on exchange rate volatility. 
                                                           
19 Both for Croatia and Turkey, the estimations are performed for three different lag structure: for one lag for both the ARCH and 
the GARCH term, and for lag structures obtained using the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria by testing for a lag length of 
up to 6. Because the results turn out to be fairly similar, only results based on the (1,1) lag structure are reported hereafter. For a 
description of the data, see appendix. 
20 Large interventions are defined as interventions higher than the average of the interventions over the whole period, and small 
interventions are those below the average. For purchases (sales), average purchases (sales) are used even for aggregate 
intervention data. Thus, what is large is defined as compared to the average of the interventions in the same direction. 
21 A positive relationship between kuna purchases and forex volatility implies that kuna purchases go hand in hand 
with lower forex volatility. For kuna sales, a negative relationship indicates that sales go in tandem with a decrease 
in forex volatility.   22
Let us now turn to the second subperiod running from 2000 to 2004. Aggregate interventions 
turn out to be negatively correlated with the exchange rate at short lag length (1 and 2), but then 
start having a positive impact on the exchange rate at higher lag length (6,7 and 8). No statistical 
relationship could be detected between aggregate interventions and forex volatility. The analysis 
of interventions disaggregated in large and small sales and purchases broadly confirm that 
interventions first have a negative effect and then kuna purchases (sales) cause the exchange rate 
to appreciate (depreciate). Using interventions with a lag of one day shows that both small and 
large purchases and sales have a negative relationship with the exchange rate, which breaks 
down at a lag of two days for small purchases and sales. This relationship, however, reverses 
quicker than for aggregate interventions, as large kuna purchases have a positive relation with 
the exchange rate when lagged with two and three days. This relationship disappears at a longer 
horizon. At the same time, small kuna sales lagged with four and six days are found to have a 
positive relationship with the exchange rate. Large kuna sales and small kuna purchases turn out 
to cause an exchange rate depreciation and appreciation at higher lag length. Combining these 
results with those of the event study approach would suggest that foreign exchange interventions 
of the Croatian National Bank first smoothes the exchange rate and at longer horizon it manages 
to reverse the trend. 
Unlike for aggregate interventions, there appears to be some statistically significant relationship 
between kuna sales and purchases on the one hand, and forex volatility, on the other. Small sales, 
large purchases, and in particular small purchases appear to decrease forex volatility. The 
dummy variable aimed at capturing the duration of the intervention is either not significant or 
has a wrong sign. 
4.2.2 Turkey 
For Turkey, the estimations were conducted for two periods: (a) for the entire period running 
from 2001 to 2004 and (b) for the period from 2002 to 2004. The reason for investigating this 
subperiod is that, as already noted earlier, there are two clearly distinguishable subperiods. In 
2001, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey undertook exclusively lira purchases on the 
foreign exchange market. During the period from 2002 to 2004, it only sold the Turkish currency 
against the US dollar. We decided not to use the period 2001 separately because of the relative 
small number of observations available for this period.   23
Estimation results for the whole period are presented in Table 12a to 12c. They support the view 
that a simple GARCH model performs best. Only for disaggregated interventions for the whole 
period was found the threshold term of the exponential GARCH model to be significant, while 
the other models could not detect any asymmetry and garch-in-mean effect in the data. 
Aggregate interventions are found to impact positively on the exchange rate with a lag of five 
days for the whole period. For the subperiod 2002 to 2004, they first have a negative impact on 
the exchange rate and then are correlated positively with the exchange rate at lag length of 2,5 
and 10 days. Interventions dampen forex volatility only during the subperiod. When 
interventions are separated into large and small lira sales and purchases for the whole sample, the 
EGARCH model with the significant λ  term shows that interventions of all kind first have a 
negative influence on exchange rate returns, and subsequently causes the exchange rate to 
appreciate (lira purchases) or to depreciate (lira sales) just as expected (see third column of Table 
12b). Nonetheless, the coefficient of both small and large lira purchases, once again, switches 
sign to negative at a lag length of four and seven days. As far as the relationship between 
interventions and forex volatility is concerned, interventions, lira purchases first dampen 
volatility but then are associated with an increase in forex volatility. By contrast, lira sales lead to 
an increase and then to a decrease in volatility as the lags increase. Taking the simple GARCH as 
the best model for the subperiod from 2002 to 2004 indicates that lira sales first causes the 
exchange rate to appreciate, then to depreciate and once again to appreciate. There seems to be 
no relationship between interventions and forex volatility. 
Our results for Turkey are roughly in line with findings reported in Domac and (2004) who 
studied the period from 2001 to 2002 using EGARCH, and found that interventions had the 
expected effect on the exchange rate and that they lowered exchange rate volatility. However, 
our results are in contrast with results by Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004), who applied the 
asymmetric component GARCH model to data from 2001 to 2003, and found that interventions 
had no impact on the exchange rate and that they increased exchange rate volatility.  
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Table 11a. Aggregate interventions, Croatia 
  1996-2004 1996-2000  2000-2004 
  GARCH GARCHM  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH   GARCH  GARCHM EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH   GARCH GARCHM EGARCH TGARCH  CGARCH  
Mean equation: t i t e
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21 φ   -0.0012*** -0.0012***  -0.0017***  -0.0012*** -0.0017***   -0.0013*** -0.0010** -0.0013***  -0.0013***  -0.0013***   -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0019***  
22 φ   -0.0011*** -0.0011***  -0.0013***  -0.0011*** -0.0013***   -0.0015*** -0.0011*** -0.0014***  -0.0014***  -0.0013***   -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.0013***  
23 φ               -0.0014***  -0.0011*** -0.0011***  -0.0014***  -0.0014***   0.0003  0.0003 0.0004  0.0003  0.0001  
24 φ             -0.0014***  -0.0009*** -0.0011***  -0.0013*** -0.0011***   0.0000  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001   
25 φ               -0.0006  -0.0006 -0.0008**  -0.0007 -0.0009**    -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000  
26 φ             -0.001**  -0.0010*    -0.001***  -0.001**   0.0007** 0.0007**  0.0005*  0.0007** 0.0006   
27 φ             -0.0004***     -0.0004**      0.0008**  0.0008**  0.0007**  0.0008**  0.0007*   
28 φ                       0.0006*  0.0006*    0.0006*     
ξ    6.7154           194.3201**         24.1551        
Variance equation:  2
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1
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− + = ∑ ∑ t t i D
i
i , ) *
t i t i (
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21 ψ   1.3E-07 1.4E-07  9.0E-02  1.0E-07 8.4E-07  -4.9E-07 -6.8e-07* -2.0E-07  2.9E-01  -2.8E-07  4.0E-07 -1.5E-07 5.0E-08 1.9E-07  2.0E-01  2.0E-08 3.0E-08  6.8E-07
22 ψ   -4.2e-07** -3.9E-07  -1.3E-01  -3.7e-07***  5.9E-07  -1.5E-06 -3.0E-07 -3.0E-08  -7.5E-04 1.0E-08  4.3E-07  -6.7E-07 -3.0E-07 -3.5E-07  -0.8566*  -2.8E-07 -3.3E-07  -6.5E-07
23 ψ             -4.6e-07***  -7.4e-07**  4.1E-02  -1.3E-07  1.5E-06  -1.4E-06 -3.0E-07 -4.8E-07  4.9E-01  -2.4E-07 1.2E-06 -1.3E-06
24 ψ             -2.7E-07  3.0E-07 5.4E-01  1.0E-07 -2.4E-07  -8.1E-07 4.6E-07 7.8E-07  2.6E-01  4.7E-07 -1.2E-06  1.0E-06
25 ψ             -7.5E-07 2.2E-07  -1.2E-01 -4.2E-07  2.7E-07  -5.5E-07 -7.0E-07 -8.9E-07  -3.9E-01  -7.5E-07 4.2E-06 -4.4E-06
26 ψ             -7.3E-07 5.8E-07    -3.3e-07**  -3.4E-07  7.7E-07 5.1E-07 3.8E-07  2.9E-02  5.0E-07 -2.8E-06  1.4E-06
27 ψ             -1.11e-06***    -9e-07***      1.1E-06 1.2E-06  8.3E-02 1.0E-06  1.9E-06  -1.4E-06
28 ψ                       -1.0E-06  -1.0E-06    -9.7E-07     
α   0.198*** 0.183***  0.606***  0.199*** 0.500***    0.149***  0.178*** 0.302***  0.149*** 0.500    0.137*** 0.132***  0.212***  0.134*** 0.500**  
β   0.755*** 0.779***  0.323***  0.812*** 0.040    0.599***  0.632*** -0.078  0.599*** 0.040    0.840*** 0.850***  0.970***  0.848***    
λ      -0.047  -0.030         -0.059  0.050         0.007  -0.006  0.044   
ρ         0.040          0.040          0.042   
δ         0.016          0.016          0.016   
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. For the variance equation, figures below CGARCH refer to the long-run variance equation, while figures in red in the next 
column refer to the short-term variance equation.  ξ  is the garch in mean term,  λ  is the asymmetric term for EGARCH and TGARCH and  ρ  and δ  are coefficient estimates from the short-term variance equation for 
CGARCH as in equation 8.    25
 
Table 11b. Disaggregated interventions: mean equations, Croatia 
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  1996-2004 1996-2000 2000-2004 
  GARCH GARCH-M  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH  GARCH GARCH-M  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH  GARCH GARCH-M  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH 
211 φ   -0.0024*** -0.0013***  -0.001***  -0.0024*** -0.0019*** -0.0011*** -0.0007  -0.0008**  -0.0011*** -0.0009  -0.003***  -0.0019***  -0.0031*** -0.003***  -0.0025*** 
221 φ   -0.0021 -0.0013  -0.0008 -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0007  -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0083***  -0.005** -0.0077***  -0.0083***  -0.0067 
231 φ   -0.0015*** -0.001*  -0.001***  -0.0015*** -0.0012**  -0.0021*** -0.001  -0.0019*** -0.0021*** -0.0014  -0.001*  -0.0008  -0.0012*** -0.001* -0.0009 
241 φ   -0.0025**  -0.0016  -0.0004 -0.0025**  -0.002  -0.0022 -0.0011  -0.0023*  -0.0022 -0.0016 -0.003* -0.002  -0.0039***  -0.003* -0.0027 
212 φ   -0.0019*** -0.0013***  -0.0013*** -0.0019*** -0.0016**  -0.0009*** -0.0006  -0.0006**  -0.0009*** -0.0007*  -0.0025*** -0.0015**  -0.0028*** -0.0025*** -0.0018** 
222 φ   -0.0024*  -0.0016  -0.0013 -0.0024*  -0.0019 -0.0023**  -0.0014  -0.0018**  -0.0023**  -0.0019*  -0.0052 -0.0026  -0.0034 -0.0052 -0.0035 
232 φ   -0.0009*** -0.0008***  -0.001***  -0.0009*** -0.0007*  -0.0006  -0.0003  -0.0016*** -0.0006  -0.0004  -0.0008**  -0.0006  -0.0007**  -0.0008** -0.0007 
242 φ   -0.0039**  -0.0025**  -0.0044*** -0.0039*** -0.0031*  -0.0054*** -0.0029  -0.007***  -0.0054*** -0.004*  -0.0023  -0.0013  -0.0009  -0.0023 -0.0017 
213 φ   0.0002 0.0000  -0.0002  0.0002 0.0001 -0.0009**  -0.0005 -0.001*** -0.0008** -0.0007  0.0011*** 0.0006**  0.0012**  0.0011*** 0.0007 
223 φ   -0.0022 -0.0015  -0.001  -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0035***  -0.0021  -0.0038*** -0.0035*** -0.0027*  0.0037  0.0022  0.0036  0.0037  0.003 
233 φ   -0.0007 -0.0006  -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0009*  -0.0006  -0.0007 -0.001**  -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0002  -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 
243 φ   0.0002 0.0001  -0.0009  0.0002 0.0002 -0.0033***  -0.0019 -0.0033***  -0.0033***  -0.0026*  0.0038 0.0023  0.006***  0.0038 0.0031 
214 φ   0.0009 0.0004  0  0.0009 0.0007 -0.0005  -0.0004 -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0004  0.0017***  0.001** 0.0013***  0.0017***  0.0013 
224 φ   -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.001  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.001  -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0012 0.0016  0.0009  -0.0025 0.0016  0.0012 
234 φ   -0.0009*  -0.0007*  -0.0006  -0.0009*  -0.0008  -0.0024*** -0.0016  -0.0018*** -0.0024*** -0.002  -0.0006  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0006  -0.0005 
244 φ   -0.0008 -0.0006  -0.0026**  -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0048***  -0.0028  -0.0036** -0.0048***  -0.0038** 0.0031*  0.0019  0.0011  0.0031  0.0025 
215 φ   0.0004 0.0001  -0.0003  0.0004 0.0003 -0.0008  -0.0005 -0.0005  -0.0008  -0.0007  0.0009 0.0005  0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 
225 φ   0.0007 0.0003  -0.0008  0.0007 0.0005 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0009  -0.001 -0.0008  0.0061 0.0039  0.0064 0.0061 0.0052 
235 φ   -0.0003 -0.0002  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003  0.0002  -0.0007 0.0003  0.0003  -0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 
245 φ   0.002 0.0011 0.002**  0.002*  0.0016  -0.0004  -0.0005  -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0022  0.0014  0.0013  0.0022  0.0018 
216 φ   0.0002 0.0000  -0.0003  0.0002 0.0002 -0.0012***  -0.0007 -0.001***  -0.0012***  -0.001*  0.0007 0.0004  0.0003 0.0007 0.0005 
226 φ   -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0011  -0.001 -0.0008  -0.002 -0.0012 -0.0026**  -0.002 -0.0016  -0.0003  -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003  -0.0002 
236 φ   0.0006 0.0003  0.0001 0.0006 0.0004 0.0012***  0.0007  0.0019***  0.0012***  0.001  0.0006 0.0003  0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 
246 φ   0.001  0.0005  -0.001  0.001  0.0008  -0.0014 -0.0011  -0.0021 -0.0014 -0.0012 0.0034**  0.0017  0.0032**  0.0034* 0.0023 
217 φ   0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002  0.0002 0.0002 -0.0007***    -0.0007**  -0.0007***    0.0006 0.0004  0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 
227 φ   0.0017 0.001  0.0015 0.0017 0.0014 0.0008   0.0003 0.0008   -0.0011  -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0011  -0.0009 
237 φ   0.0011*** 0.0006***  0.0007*  0.0011*** 0.0009**  -0.0004    -0.0001  -0.0004    0.0012*** 0.0007*  0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.001* 
247 φ   0.0023*  0.0014  0.0018 0.0023 0.0018 0.0022*    0.0025**  0.0022*    0.0014  0.0008 0.001 0.0014  0.001 
218 φ   0.0003*  0.0004    0.0003*  0.0003     -0.0004*      0.0005   0.0004 0.0005  
228 φ   0.0001 -0.0001   0.0001 0.0001     -0.0017**      0.0091***    0.0097***  0.0091***   
238 φ   0.001** 0.0007**   0.001** 0.0008*     0.0009      0.0011***    0.0009**  0.0011***   
248 φ   -0.0001 -0.0001    -0.0001 -0.0001     0.003*      -0.0042   -0.0046**  -0.0041  
6 φ   0.0002 0.0000  -0.0001  0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0016**  0.001  0.0017***  0.0015**  0.0013 
7 φ   0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001  0  0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
ξ    0.5707      210.951      8.5294     
Notes: as for Table 11a.   26
Table 11c. Disaggregated interventions: variance equations, Croatia 
Variance equation:  2
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  1996-2004 1996-2000  2000-2004 
  GARCH GARCH-M  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH   GARCH  GARCH-M  EGARCH TGARCH  CGARCH    GARCH  GARCH-M  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH  
211 ψ   6.5E-07 -1.8E-07 -0.2936  5.8E-07 -1.2E-07  -1.4E-07 6e-07*** 8.5E-07  -0.2669  6.4e-07***  -3.0E-08  0.0E+00  1.2E-06 1.4E-06 0.3023  1.2E-06 -7E-08  3.6E-06
221 ψ   2.4E-06 1E-06  0.5828 2.3E-06 1.6E-06  1.5E-06 5E-07 1.4E-06  -0.8780  7.3E-07  2.6E-07  -5.9E-07  1.452e-05*** 1.587e-05*** 8.8537*** 1.061e-05*** 2.7E-06 6E-08 
231 ψ   -9.1E-07 1.7E-07  0.0740  -8.8E-07 6E-08  1.7E-07 -1.95e-06*** -6.5E-07 -2.9106**  -2.18e-06*** 9.0E-08  -1.2E-06  -7.8E-07 -8.3E-07 0.4111  -8.3E-07 -7E-08  -1.3E-06 
241 ψ   -2.6E-06 -1.8E-06  -0.4053 -3.31e-06*  -2.2E-07  -6.8E-07 -4E-07 -5.2E-07  -0.6020  -7.1E-07  1.4E-06  -1.1E-06  -6.31e-06*** -6.5E-06 -6.2316***  -6.24e-06*** -1.3E-06  -4E-08 
212 ψ   3.9E-07 6.9E-07  0.6540 3.1E-07 -2E-08 -3E-08  6.6e-07*** 1.1E-06  1.8153** 8.3e-07*** 3.0E-07  4.5E-07  6.9e-07**  1.2E-06 -0.2144  6.8E-07 -4E-08  3.1E-06
222 ψ   2.1E-06 8E-07  2.1771 2.1E-06 9.1E-07  1E-06  1E-06 7.8E-07  2.9128  1.1E-06  4.5E-07  9.9E-07  2.8E-07 5.82e-06*  4.7200  3.2E-06 3.8E-06  -6.6E-07 
232 ψ   -1.3E-06 -1.56e-06*  -0.7173 -1.4E-06 -2.1E-07  -4.7E-07 1.2E-06 3E-08  0.1868  1.1E-06 2.3E-07  5.0E-07  -8.8E-07 -1E-06  -1.7076**  -9.4E-07 -4.1E-07  -1.1E-06 
242 ψ   -1.1E-06 3E-08  0.7112  -9.9E-07 2E-07  -2E-07  1.7E-06 1.5E-07  2.2332  2.3E-06 9.7E-07  8.3E-07  -1.7E-06 -5.67e-06**  -4.3919* -2.4E-06 -5.4E-07  -1E-08 
213 ψ   6.8E-07 8.6e-07**  0.3611 6E-07  5E-08 9E-08  6E-08 4.4E-07  -0.0424  -5.0E-08  -1.1E-07  2.8E-07  7.9E-07 1.68e-06*  -0.3793  7.8E-07 -2E-08  4.1E-06
223 ψ   2.4E-06 1.7E-07  -3.1115  2.4E-06 7.3E-07  3.3E-07 4.1E-07 6.9E-07  -1.2753  5.6E-07 -5.3E-07  -6.2E-07  5.21e-06* 4E-06  7.0140*** 4.5E-06  2.7E-06  -3E-08 
233 ψ   -3.6E-07 6.2E-07  0.4277  -3E-07  5E-08  3E-08  -1.4E-06 -7.1E-07  0.0576 -1.6E-06 -2.9E-07  1.3E-07  -5.3E-07 -6.9E-07 -0.4358  -5.8E-07 -4E-08  5.7E-07
243 ψ   -1.4E-06 4E-06  1.1525  -1.5E-06 7.4E-07  5.2E-07 -7.4E-07 -1.7E-06  -2.4618  -1.5E-06 6.6E-07  -1.2E-06  1.7E-06 5.3E-07 2.2791  1.8E-07 3.4E-07  2.7E-07
214 ψ   4.2E-07 -9E-08  -0.5676  4E-07  -4E-08 1.4E-07 1.8E-07 4.9E-07  0.5235  3.1E-07 1.4E-07  1.6E-07  2.9E-07 5.2e-07**  0.2514  4.6E-07 0  -2E-07 
224 ψ   2.1E-06 9.9E-07  0.7567 2.1E-06 7.2E-07  5.2E-07 4.9E-07 8.8E-07  -0.7646  6.9E-07 -1.1E-07  5.0E-08  -2.6E-07  4.5E-06 0.9250  1.5E-06 6.2E-07  -1E-08 
234 ψ   -2E-07 4.3E-07 0.1169  -2.5E-07  1E-07  1.1E-07 -6.7e-07* -6.3E-07  -2.1190 -7.2e-07***  -4.6E-07  -8.6E-07  -3.8E-07 -7.9E-07 -0.0066  -5E-07  -8E-08  -8.8E-07 
244 ψ   -1.4E-06 4.2E-06  1.8354  -1.6E-06 5.5E-07  6.2E-07 5.4E-06 1.8E-06  7.0331***  5.0E-06 6.8E-07  4.1E-07  -4.1E-06 -2.7E-06 -2.7652  -2.3E-06 -4.5E-07  2E-08 
215 ψ   4.6E-07 5E-08  -0.0586  6.1E-07 -9E-08 0  6E-08 3.8E-07  -0.9053  1.4E-07  6.9E-07  -1.3E-06  1.8E-07 -1.2E-07  0.1569  2.3E-07 -1.2E-07  -3.5E-07 
225 ψ   2.1E-06 -4.4E-07 1.7068 1.9E-06 1.1E-06  1.6E-06 9.1E-07 1.1E-06  3.5604**  9.0E-07 3.5E-07  1.3E-06  4.1E-06 7.4e-06* -3.3926  4.6E-06 1.3E-06  -7E-08 
235 ψ   -1.3E-06 -7.8E-07  -0.2963 -1.1E-06 3E-08  6E-08  4E-07 -8.2E-07  1.5057  4.4E-07  1.3E-06  2.0E-07  -7.4E-07 -1.2E-06 -0.4905  -8.1E-07 -1.9E-07  3E-07 
245 ψ   -2.4E-06 -6.8E-06  -3.3579 -2.3E-06 -2.5E-07  -5.9E-07 -5.9E-06 -2.6E-06  -2.1366  -4.8E-06 2.8E-06  -3.7E-06  -1.2E-07 -3E-08  0.1970  -1.1E-07 1.6E-07  -1.1E-07 
216 ψ   6.9E-07 -7.4E-07 -0.1981  8.5E-07 -1.3E-07  -1.5E-07 5.4E-07 7.3e-07* 0.7727  5.8e-07**  8.7E-07  -7.3E-07  3E-08 -7.9E-07  -1.3075  8E-08 -1.1E-07  3.9E-06
226 ψ   1.8E-06 -5.3E-07 -3.0279  1.8E-06 1.5E-07  3E-08  -1E-06 3.6E-07 -2.4689  -8.1E-07  -1.7E-06  7.0E-07  1.062e-05** 1.287e-05*** 13.6143***  1.029e-05** 4E-06  -6.1E-07 
236 ψ   -6E-07 -8e-07* -0.4620  -6E-07 -9E-08  -3.8E-07 -1.4E-06 -1.4E-06  -0.6580  -1.5E-06 9.3E-07  -2.2E-06  -8.3E-07 -1.1E-06 -1.0801***  -8.6E-07 -4.3E-07  -1.9E-06 
246 ψ   -1.7E-06 3.4E-06  2.0021  -1.5E-06 3.3E-07  1.9E-07 2.3E-06 5.2E-07  1.9545  1.5E-06 5.2E-06  -4.5E-06  -7e-06*  -4.9E-06 -4.7825***  -5.1E-06 -1E-06  5.6E-07
217 ψ   9.3E-07 1.39e-06**  0.2137 1.1E-06 2.2E-07  6.2E-07 8.5e-07***   1.4001  8.8e-07***     6.3E-07 3.5E-07 2.0646***  6.6E-07 3E-08  4E-06 
227 ψ   2.5E-06 8.8E-07  1.2838 2.4E-06 7.4E-07  7.6E-07 2.8E-07   -2.7660  4.7E-07     5.97e-06**  7.27e-06*** 12.2735***  6.25e-06*** 1.9E-06  3E-08 
237 ψ   -4.9E-07 3.9E-07  0.7242* -5E-07  1.9E-07  2.4E-07 8.3E-07   -1.5961  6.5E-07     -7.5E-07 -8.7E-07 0.2470  -7.4E-07 -3E-08  1.5E-06
247 ψ   -1.4E-06 3.8E-07  -0.8755 -1.2E-06 3.6E-07  3.1E-07 -3.2E-07   0.2141 -4.6E-07     3.4E-06 -3.9E-07  1.7334  1.1E-06 7.5E-07   
218 ψ   4.2E-07 -4.7E-07   4.1E-07 -1E-07 -1.7E-07    1.2083       3.7E-07   -0.7837  4.2E-07    
228 ψ   2.18e-06** 9.4E-07   2.2E-06  2.4E-07  3.3E-07    3.0921*       4.01e-06*   6.5411  4.15e-06*    
238 ψ   -1.09e-06* -3.3E-07   -9.4E-07  -2E-08  2E-08     2.6312       -6.9E-07   -0.3190  -6.5E-07    
248 ψ   -1.8E-06 3E-08   -1.8E-06  2.4E-07  1.2E-07    3.0562       -2.4E-06   0.5173  -2.8E-06   1.2E-06
6 ψ   -2.9E-07 -4E-08 0.0272  -2.8E-07  -8E-08  -1E-07  -2E-08 -1E-08  -0.4241**  -4.0E-08  0.0E+00  -2.1E-07  -8.6E-07  -1.59e-06* -0.3768  -1.36e-06* -4.2E-07  -1.3E-07 
7 ψ   -1.5E-07 1.1E-07 0.0166  -1.3E-07  -1E-08  3E-08  2E-08 -9E-08 -0.1273  -2.0E-08  -3.9E-07  2.4E-07  -4E-07  -5.3E-07 0.2370  -4.7E-07 -1.5E-07  0 
α   0.149*** 0.150***  0.215***  0.149*** 0.500    0.149*** 0.149***  0.431***  0.149*** 0.500    0.149*** 0.149*** 0.491*** 0.149*** 0.500  
β   0.599*** 0.599***  0.981***  0.599*** 0.040    0.599*** 0.599***  0.278* 0.599*** 0.040    0.599*** 0.599*** 0.054  0.599*** 0.040   
λ       0.009  0.050         -0.002  0.050        -0.016  0.050    
ρ         0.040            0.040            0.040   
δ         0.016            0.016            0.016   
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Table 12a. Aggregate interventions, Turkey 
 2001-2004  2002-2004 
  GARCH  GARCH-M  EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH   GARCH  GARCH-M EGARCH TGARCH CGARCH  
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2 1  
21 φ   -0.0103 -0.0346 -0.0416 -0.0119 -0.0085   -0.1134***  -0.0388 -0.0677**  -0.0984***  -0.045   
22 φ   -0.0265 0.0234  0.0471  -0.0259 -0.0265   0.0818**  0.0816***  0.0856***  0.0621**  0.0645*  
23 φ   -0.0003 -0.0067 -0.0063 -0.0043 0.0273    0.0071    -0.0305 0.0068     
24 φ   -0.0179 -0.0418 -0.0162 -0.0149 -0.0288   -0.0135   -0.0115 -0.0101    
25 φ   0.1115*** 0.0922*** 0.0497*  0.1041*** 0.0834***   0.0646*    0.0665**  0.0473     
26 φ          -0.0284    0.0045    
27 φ          0.0194    0.0354    
28 φ          0.0085    -0.0045    
29 φ          -0.0355    -0.0576*    
210 φ          0.0544**    0.0631*    
ξ    2.057        3.304      
Variance equation:  2
1
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21 ψ   -0.0003  -0.00054*  0.5857 -0.00058*  0.0005 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0002  -2.6065  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008
22 ψ   0.0005  0.0009**  -2.8032 0.00091*  -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004  0.0003  -2.3691 0.0000  0.0006  -0.0003
23 ψ   0.0000 0.0000 -0.3244  0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 -0.00077*    4.4851 -0.0001     
24 ψ   0.0001 -0.0001  8.2736 -0.0002  0.0010 -0.0012 0.0002   -5.9677  -0.0001     
25 ψ   -0.0003 -0.0001 -4.4205 -0.0001 0.0000  -0.0006 0.0000    6.7363  0.0002     
26 ψ          0.0003    0.0002    
27 ψ          -0.0003    -0.0003    
28 ψ          0.0000    0.0001    
29 ψ          0.0000    0.0002    
210 ψ          0.0000    -0.0001    
α   0.198*** 0.265*** 0.136  0.220*** 0.524***   0.273*** 0.211*** 0.509*** 0.206*** 0.501   
β   0.677*** 0.562*** 0.77472***  0.66742*** 0.114    0.595***  0.618*** 0.831*** 0.607*** 0.046   
λ     0.090  -0.057       0.067  0.030    
ρ       0.079        0.043   
δ       0.018        0.016   
Notes: as for Table 11a.   28
Table 12b. Disaggregated interventions, Turkey, 2001-2004 
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 GARCH  GARCHM  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH   GARCH  GARCHM  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH   
211 φ   0.0291 0.0021  -0.0544***  0.0287 0.0143  211 ψ   -0.00065 -0.00007  3.23191  -0.00076  -0.00011  -0.00015
221 φ   -0.2869 -0.1916  0.0926  -0.287  -0.2476  221 ψ   -0.00031 -0.00201  -14.78531  -0.00091  -0.00013  -0.00023
231 φ   -0.0926*** -0.039  -0.0763*** -0.0925*** -0.0732  231 ψ   -0.00008 -0.00014  2.41959  -0.00008  -0.00005  -0.00006
241 φ   -0.0977* -0.0487  -0.0686**  -0.0976* -0.0696  241 ψ   -0.00028 -0.00062  -14.57193  -0.00025  -0.00024  -0.00029
212 φ   -0.1189*** -0.0595  -0.0081  -0.1191*** -0.0773** 212 ψ   -0.00154  -0.00394* -10.16289*** -0.00202 -0.00011 -0.00013
222 φ   0.0771 0.0384  -0.1499*  0.0771 0.0801  222 ψ   -0.00035 -0.00059  -13.06938  -0.00094  -0.00013  -0.00025
232 φ   0.0862*** 0.051*  0.1067*** 0.0858*** 0.0563  232 ψ   -0.00011 -0.00004  2.41778  -0.0001  -0.00005  -0.00006
242 φ   0.0494 -0.0034 0.0173 0.0498 0.0058  242 ψ   -0.00022 -0.00017  -17.66701** -0.00022  -0.0002  -0.00028
213 φ   0.0521 0.0119  0.0161 0.0518 0.0199  213 ψ   0.00013 -0.00013  -7.65482***  -0.00015 -0.00018 -0.0002 
223 φ   0.2051 0.1279  0.2075***  0.2051 0.1742  223 ψ   -0.00012 0.00116  -11.66949  0.00006  -0.0001  -0.00016
233 φ   0.0091 0.0043  -0.0266 0.0089 0.003  233 ψ   -0.00017 -0.00011  -8.8831  -0.00017  -0.00004  -0.00004
243 φ   0.0411 0.0358  -0.0167 0.0412 0.0336  243 ψ   -0.00022 0.00077  32.16906*** -0.00025  -0.00012  -0.00014
214 φ   -0.0945** -0.046  0.0195  -0.0944** -0.0533  214 ψ   0.00046  0.00218* 5.11656  0.00059 -0.00016  -0.00012
224 φ   -0.0469 0.0288  -0.104***  -0.0468 -0.0266  224 ψ   -0.00014 -0.0014  -3.70408  -0.00029  -0.0001  -0.00018
234 φ   -0.0189 0.0189  0.0353  -0.0187 0.0046  234 ψ   -0.00018 0.00012  -11.21732*  -0.0002  -0.00006  -0.00011
244 φ   0.0007 0.0271  0.0259 0.0009 0.0242  244 ψ   -0.00021 -0.00041  2.7804  -0.00024  -0.00008  0 
215 φ   0.1715*** 0.0741**  -0.0119  0.1717*** 0.1159**  215 ψ   -0.00027 -0.00085  2.0997  -0.00022  -0.00033  -0.00034
225 φ   -0.0109 0.0752  -0.0448 -0.0108 -0.0061  225 ψ   -0.00006 0.00142  -0.46829  -0.00006  -0.0001  -0.00016
235 φ   0.0576 0.0579  0.0335 0.0573 0.0382  235 ψ   -0.00017 0.0001  6.76607  -0.00022  -0.00004  -0.00006
245 φ   0.0522 0.0403  0.1578**  0.0522 0.0206  245 ψ   -0.00021 0.00004  -20.08794*  -0.00024  -0.00015  -0.00019
216 φ   -0.0231   0.0466***  -0.0229 -0.0048  216 ψ   0.00069 -0.00002  15.61577*** 0.0007  -0.00023 -0.00001
226 φ   0.1032   0.0449 0.1032 -0.0264  226 ψ   -0.00007 -0.00001  23.11917* -0.00028  -0.0001  -0.00017
236 φ   0.0696**   0.0464*  0.0697** 0.0539  236 ψ   -0.00011 0***  20.67539*** -0.00008  -0.00002  -0.00002
246 φ   -0.0047   -0.0579 -0.0047 -0.022  246 ψ   -0.00021 -9e-05***  34.73022*** -0.00023  -0.00009  0 
217 φ   0.0177   -0.0759***  0.0179 -0.0138  217 ψ   -0.00006 -9e-05***  -11.95601*** 0.00019  -0.00019  -0.00029
227 φ   0.3472*   0.1318  0.3472* 0.1897  227 ψ   0.00008 -6e-05*** 7.05865  0.0001  -0.00008 -0.00011
237 φ   0.0024   0.0082 0.0028 0.0119  237 ψ   -0.00012 -4e-05**  3.24445  -0.00017  -0.00003  -0.00004
247 φ   0.2131***   0.1276*** 0.2132*** 0.1263*  247 ψ   -0.00022   26.11285**  -0.00024  -0.00018  -0.00007
218 φ   -0.0642*   -0.0302**  -0.0646*   218 ψ   0.0001   0.84433  0.00009     
228 φ   -0.1718   -0.1334 -0.1717   228 ψ   0.00024   17.00718  0.00046     
238 φ   0.0052   -0.0033 0.005    238 ψ   -0.00008   -0.95435  -0.00011     
248 φ   -0.149**   -0.0957**  -0.1488**    248 ψ   -0.00025   -29.84616*** -0.00026     
219 φ   0.058*     0.0577*    219 ψ   0.00024   0.00189  0.00039     
229 φ   -0.1749     -0.175    229 ψ   0.00011   -0.49003  0.00013     
239 φ   -0.0649*     -0.065*    239 ψ   -0.00003   0.03197***  0.00001     
249 φ   -0.1041*     -0.104**   249 ψ   -0.0003   0.35727* -0.0003     
2110 φ   -0.0621**     -0.0621**   2110 ψ   -0.00057   -0.19444  -0.00077     
2210 φ   0.114     0.1139    2210 ψ   0.00031   0.04063  0.00052     
2310 φ   0.067*     0.0668*    2310 ψ   -0.00002   0.13617  0.00002     
2410 φ   0.1394**     0.1396***    2410 ψ   -0.00032     -0.00031     
6 φ   0.0009 0.0007  -0.0008 0.0009 0.0014  6 ψ   -0.00004     -6e-05*  0.00001  0.00002 
7 φ   -0.0027* -0.0021  -0.003***  -0.0026* -0.0022  7 ψ   -0.00001     -0.00001  0  0 
ξ    1.3821      ξ             
α          α   0.1474*** 0.159***  0.679*** 0.148***  0.49997  
β          β   0.586*** 0.585***  0.316*** 0.586***  0.04024  
λ          λ      0.206***  0.047     
ρ          ρ          0.04013   
δ          δ          0.01599   
Notes: as for Table 11a.   29
Table 12c. Disaggregated interventions, Turkey, 2002-2004 
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 GARCH  GARCH-M  EGARCH  TGARCH CGARCH GARCH  GARCH-M  EGARCH  TGARCH  CGARCH  
211 φ   -0.0937*** -0.0554  -0.0713*** -0.092***  -0.0737  211 ψ   -0.00002  -0.00005 -4.90684 -0.00009  -0.00010  -0.00034
221 φ   -0.1209** -0.0667  -0.0712** -0.1179*** -0.0887  221 ψ   -0.00014 -0.00022  -19.78222* -0.00039 -0.00017 -0.00016
212 φ   0.0767**  0.0389  0.1162*** 0.0898*** 0.0518  212 ψ   0.00000 -0.00001  9.54160  0.00008 0.00001 0.00009
222 φ   0.0458 0.0043  0.0389 0.0477 0.0069  222 ψ   -0.00011  -0.00014 -8.60842 -0.00042  -0.00015  -0.00058
213 φ   0.0176 0.0062  -0.0341  0.0119 0.0083  213 ψ   -0.00007 -0.00005  -15.4528*  -0.00019 -0.00003 0.00000
223 φ   0.0617 0.0366  0.0203 0.0595 0.048  223 ψ   -0.00008 -0.00003  34.88599***  0.00066  0.00018  0.00039
214 φ   -0.0152 0.0038  -0.0002 -0.0195 0.0044  214 ψ   -0.00005 0.00008  -6.47571  -0.00012 -0.00007 -0.00032
224 φ   0.0151 0.0257  -0.0405  0.0187 0.0338  224 ψ   -0.00004  -0.00001 -8.62810 -0.00046  0.00001  0.00006
215 φ   0.0492 0.0247  0.0617**  0.0484 0.0323  215 ψ   -0.00003 -0.00007  6.36446  -0.00006 0.00007  -0.00003
225 φ   0.0275 0.0022  0.1328**  0.0329 0.003  225 ψ   -0.00003 -0.00004  -11.75617  0.00023  -0.00008 -0.00032
216 φ   0.0658*  0.0378  0.0555** 0.0676** 0.0494  216 ψ   -0.00001 -0.00005  12.49119  0.00018  0.00014  0.00018
226 φ   -0.0252 -0.0301  -0.0001 -0.0269 -0.0397  226 ψ   -0.00001 0.00005  27.3937**  0.00015  0.00010  0.00050
217 φ   -0.0032 0.002  -0.0106 0.0029  0.0031  217 ψ   -0.00012 -0.00003  3.19401  -0.00010 0.00017  0.00009
227 φ   0.2143*** 0.0948*  0.0732*  0.2088*** 0.1286**  227 ψ   0.00002 0.00005  26.50474* 0.00024 -0.00036  0.00091
218 φ   0.0076   0.0362 0.0187   218 ψ   -0.00004   -17.14624* 0.00000     
228 φ   -0.1184*   -0.0769  -0.1156**    228 ψ   -0.00005   -65.5094***  0.00014     
219 φ   -0.0635*   -0.0154  -0.0629**    219 ψ   0.00005   13.12826  0.00017    
229 φ   -0.1019*   -0.0273  -0.0957*   229 ψ   -0.00008   12.33948  -0.00001    
2110 φ   0.0535   0.0071 0.0439   2110 ψ 0.00012   0.91074  0.00003    
2210 φ   0.1096*   0.0968**  0.1103*   2210 ψ -0.00014   10.82656  -0.00047    
6 φ   -0.0024* -0.0014  -0.004***  -0.0026**  -0.0018  6 ψ   0.00000 0.00000  -0.05331  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
ξ    3.3818      ξ            
α          α   0.150*** 0.151***  0.626*** 0.181***  0.500   
β          β   0.598*** 0.599***  0.725*** 0.604***  0.041   
λ          λ      0.090  0.047    
ρ          ρ         0.041   
δ          δ         0.016   
Notes: as for Table 11a. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the impact of foreign exchange interventions in two EU candidate 
countries, namely in Croatia and Turkey by applying the event study methodology to the data, 
and by analyzing a variety of the class of GARCH models. The results indicate that the event 
study and the econometric estimations are complementary rather than competing approaches. 
The event study approach can be used to analyze only a fraction of foreign exchange 
interventions by the Croatian National Bank because of its regular interventions leaving little 
time to elapse between two interventions (episodes). For the non-overlapping intervention 
episodes, the rate of success was found to vary between 60% and 80%. The successful episodes   30
were mainly leaning against the wind and exchange rate smoothing. Some qualification merits 
mention. First, it appeared that the share of exchange rate smoothing was higher than that of 
leaning against the wind in the direct aftermath of the intervention episodes. However, the share 
of leaning against the wind steadily increases for larger post-event windows. This implies that 
interventions (kuna purchases/sales) first start to decrease the pace of depreciation/appreciation, 
and as time goes by, they even manage to change the trend on the foreign exchange market. 
Second, interventions appear to be more effective from 2000/2001 to 2004 than during the late 
1990s. In addition, some evidence is also found for the existence of a signaling channel. 
The econometric estimations confirm the earlier finding that interventions are more effective 
during the second subperiod. They also reveal that the dynamics of the different types of 
interventions (small and large kuna sales and purchases) varies considerably. Nonetheless, the 
general pattern that emerges is that interventions first have a negative relationship with the 
exchange rate, which reverses when interventions with higher lags are used. This is broadly in 
line with findings of the event study approach and suggests that kuna sales/purchases dampen the 
pace of the kuna appreciation/depreciation in a first stage (exchange rate smoothing) and 
subsequently are able to reverse the trend of the exchange rate (leaning against the wind). For 
forex volatility, some evidence is found for that interventions are associated with lower 
volatility. During the late 1990s, large kuna sales and purchases are found to decrease forex 
volatility, while from 2000 to 2004, small kuna sales and purchases tended to be correlated with 
lower forex volatility. 
For Turkey, the event study approach revealed that the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
intervened periodically, but massively on the foreign exchange market. The identified four 
intervention episodes are all found to have been very effective. The Turkish central bank always 
acted as leaning against the wind, and the interventions had a significant impact on changes in 
the exchange rate against the dollar to a horizon up to 60 days. Regarding unconditional 
exchange rate volatility, the first intervention episode occurred in 2001 in the aftermath of the 
currency crisis clearly dampened volatility, whilst the episodes in 2002 and 2004 turn out to have 
led to higher volatility with comparison to the pre-event volatility. The third intervention episode 
taking place in 2003 first increased volatility but then resulted in lower volatility at the horizons 
of 30 to 60 days.    31
Although the results of the GARCH estimations are less convincing than those of the event study 
approach, they also suggest that foreign exchange interventions were successful at specific lag 
length to change the trend of the exchange rate. The analysis of the conditional variance for the 
whole period indicated that lira purchases are associated first with a decrease and then with an 
increase in volatility. By contrast, lira sales appeared to generate more volatility in a first step, 
followed by some dampening effect on forex volatility. However, no relationship could be 
detected for the subperiod. 
Combining the results of the event study and the econometric estimations suggest that both lira 
purchases and lira sales were successful, to some extent, in changing the trend of exchange rate 
movements (leaning against the wind) and lowering exchange rate volatility. These findings 
underline that the official policy statements of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 
according to which the aim of forex interventions is to decrease forex volatility but not to affect 
the level of the exchange rate, are somewhat in contrast with the achievements. The question that 
could be asked is whether there is perhaps too much exchange rate targeting and insufficient 
volatility targeting? 
Overall, the results of this study gives further evidence in favor of the fact that emerging market 
economies are in a good position to carry out (sterilized) foreign exchange interventions 
effectively.   32
References 
Aguilar, Javiera and Stefan Nydahl (2000): Central bank intervention and exchange rates: The case of Sweden, 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 10, 303-322. 
Brandner, P. and H. Grech (2002): Why did central banks intervene in the EMS? The post 1993 experience, 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank Working Paper No. 77. 
Brandner, P., Grech H and H. Stix (2001): The effectiveness of central bank intervention in the EMS: The post 1993 
experience, Oesterreichische Nationalbank Working Paper No. 55. 
Brissimis, Sophocles N. and Dionysios P. Chionis (2004): Foreign exchange market intervention: implications of 
publicly announced and secret intervention for the euro exchange rate and its volatility, Journal of Policy Modeling, 
26, 661-673. 
Calvo, G.A. and C.M. Reinhart (2000): Fear of floating, NBER Working Paper No. 7993. 
Canales-Kriljenko, Jorge Iván (2003): Foreign exchange intervention in developing and transition economies: 
Results of a survey, IMF Working Paper No. 95. 
Canales-Kriljenko, Jorge-Iván, Roberto Guimaraes and Cem Karacadag (2003): Official intervention in the foreign 
exchange market: Elements of best practice, IMF Working Paper No 152. 
Central Bank of Turkey (2001, 2002, 2003): Annual Report 
Central Bank of Turkey (2004): General framework of monetary and exchange rate policy in 2004, Press Release 
No. 2. 
Croatian National Bank (2001, 2002, 2003): Annual Report. 
Domac, Ilker and Alfonso Mendoza (2004): Is there room for forex interventions under inflation targeting 
framework? Evidence from Mexico and Turkey, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3288. 
Dominguez, Kathryn M. (1998): Central bank intervention and exchange rate volatility, Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 17, 161-190. 
Dutta, Jayasri and Leon Hyginus (2002): Dread of depreciation: Measuring real exchange rate interventions, IMF 
Working Paper No. 63. 
Edison, Hali, Paul Cashin and Hong Liang (2003): Foreign exchange intervention and the Australian dollar: Has it 
mattered? IMF Working Paper No 99. 
Fatum, Rasmus (2000): On the effectiveness of sterilised Foreign Exchange Intervention, ECB Working Paper No. 
10. 
Fatum, Rasmus and Michael M. Hutchison (2003): Effectiveness of official daily foreign exchange market 
intervention operations in Japan, NBER Working Paper No. 9648. 
Guimaraes, Roberto and Cem Karacadag (2004): The empirics of foreign exchange intervention in emerging market 
countries: The case of Mexico and Turkey, IMF Working Paper 123. 
Kearns, Jonathan and Roberto Rigobon (2002): Identifying the efficacy of central bank interventions: The Australian 
case, NBER Working Paper No. 9062. 
Kim, Suk-Joong, Tro Kortian and Jeffrey Sheen (2000): Central bank intervention and exchange rate volatility – 
Australian evidence, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 10, 381-405. 
Mihaljek, Dubravko (2005): Survey of central banks’ views on effects of intervention. Bank for International 
Settlements, mimeo. 
Morana, Claudia and Andrea Beltratti (2000): Central bank interventions and exchange rates: an analysis with high 
frequency data, , Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 10, 349-362. 
Ramaswamy, Ramana and Hossein Samiei (2000): The yen-dollar rate: Have interventions mattered? IMF Working 
Paper No. 95. 
Rogers, J.M. and P.L. Siklos (2003): Foreign exchange market intervention in two small open economies: The 
Canadian and Australian experience, Journal of International Money and Finance, 22, 393-416. 
Sarno, Lucio and Mark P. Taylor (2001): Official intervention in the foreign exchange market: Is it effective, and, if 
so, how does it work? CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2690. 
   33
Data Appendix 
Daily intervention data are obtained from the national central banks. The sample period spans 
from January 1996 to September 2004 for Croatia and from January 2001 to June 2004 for 
Turkey. The interventions are expressed in the domestic currencies (billions of Croatia kuna) for 
Croatia because the sample period comprises the switch from the German mark to the euro. 
Expressing interventions in the same currency units ensures full comparability. The intervention 
series are Interventions by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey are expressed in terms of 
billions of US dollar. In accordance with common practice in the literature, purchases (sales) of 
the foreign currency are positive (negative) values. Thus, purchases (sales) of the domestic 
currencies are denoted with negative (positive) figures. Exchange rate series against the German 
mark and the euro are used for Croatia (provided by the respective central banks, and against the 
US dollar for Turkey (obtained from Datastream, code: TKUSDSP). Exchange rates are defined 
as units of the domestic currency per one unit of the foreign currency. This implies that a 
decrease (increase) in the exchange rate is an appreciation (depreciation). The exchange rate 
returns series are obtained as first differences of the level series taken in natural logs. Only data 
for trading days are considered for the study implying the exclusion of weekends and public 
holidays. 
For the interest rates, overnight money market rates are used. The data for Croatia and Germany 
are obtained from the Croatian National Bank and the Bundesbank, whilst the data for Turkey 
and the US are drawn from Bloomberg. 
Large interventions are defined as interventions higher than the average of the interventions over 
the whole period, and small interventions are those below the average. For purchases (sales), 
average purchases (sales) are used even for aggregate intervention data. Thus, what is large is 
defined as compared to the average of the interventions in the same direction.  
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